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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ERISA, STATE AND LOCAL HEALTH
CARE EXPERIMENTATION, AND THE




The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides a
comprehensive federal scheme for the regulation of employee benefit plans, which
include employee welfare benefit plans. Under Section 514(a) of ERISA, any state
law that relates to employee benefit plans is preempted by ERISA. Judicial
decisions have generally interpreted the scope of ERISA preemption to be fairly
expansive; however, some recent decisions have narrowed the scope of Section
514(a) to some degree. Nonetheless, ERISA's preemption clause continues to
significantly limit state and local efforts at health care reform. Several states and
localities have experimented with fair share laws, which seek to increase access to
health care and provide a means by which to finance such expansion. Employer
spending mandates under such laws have been subject to legal challenges as
expressly preempted by ERISA. To date, only San Francisco's fair share law has
survived an ERISA challenge. More importantly, the debate over the relationship
between ERISA preemption and fair share laws implicates significant issues with
respect to health care reform at the local, state, and national levels. The U.S.
Supreme Court should grant certiorari in this matter in order to clarify the
boundaries of health care reform within which state and local governments can
safely operate without conflicting with ERISA. Even with the enactment of
national health care reform, if the Supreme Court decides not to hear Golden Gate
Restaurant Ass'n v. City & County of San Francisco,' Congress should consider
amending ERISA (1) to enable state and local governments to continue
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experimenting with health care reform in the short term, since many of the national
benefits will not be available for several years and (2) to grant state and local
governments the option of enacting expanded health care benefits beyond the scope
of the national legislation. This course of action would not only enhance the federal
government's efforts to develop a national model for health care reform, but it
would also increase the likelihood of bridging the gap between the uninsured and
access to health care.
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INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 2 provides a
comprehensive federal scheme for the regulation of employee benefit plans, which
include employee welfare benefit plans.3 By definition, employee welfare benefit
plans generally provide for hospital, medical, surgical, sickness, accident,
disability, death, unemployment, severance, or similar benefits; thus, health care
benefit plans fall within the scope of ERISA.4 Under Section 514(a) of ERISA, any
state law that relates to employee benefit plans is preempted by ERISA.5 In general,
judicial decisions have interpreted the scope of ERISA preemption to be fairly
2. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
3. See infra Part I.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006).
5. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 514(a).
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expansive; 6 however, some more recent decisions have narrowed the scope of
Section 514(a) to some degree. Nonetheless, ERISA's preemption clause
continues to significantly limit state and local efforts at health care reform.
8
As the number of uninsured individuals has increased and access to health
care has decreased in the United States,9 a range of measures has been implemented
in an effort to reverse these trends.1 ° In particular, several states and localities have
experimented with fair share laws, also known as pay or play statutes1 1 In general,
fair share laws require employers subject to the statute to choose between either
paying a requisite amount in employee health care expenditures or contributing to a
fund, administered by the state or locality, which offsets health care costs for the
uninsured.' 2 In this manner, fair share laws not only seek to address the twin issues
of reducing the number of uninsured and increasing access to health care but also
the means by which to finance such efforts. 3
Notwithstanding these laudable goals, such state and local health care reform
initiatives have been subject to legal challenges on the grounds that ERISA
expressly preempts fair share laws in general and their employer spending
mandates in particular. Specifically, Maryland, Suffolk County, NY, and the city of
San Francisco all enacted their own versions of fair share laws; 14 in each instance,
however, trade associations representing affected employers attacked the laws as
preempted by ERISA. In both Maryland and Suffolk County, the courts have sided
with the trade associations, concluding that ERISA preempted the challenged fair
share laws. 15 In stark contrast, however, San Francisco's fair share law has survived
its legal challenge to date.
16
6. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 & n.21 (1983) (noting ERISA applies to
"any employee benefit plan" and analyzing the "narrow" exceptions to preemption).
7. E.g., Mattei v. Mattei, 126 F.3d 794, 811 (1997).
8. Jesselyn Alicia Brown, ERISA and State Health Care Reform: Roadblock or Scapegoat?, 13
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 339, 339-40 (1995); see also Amy B. Monahan, Pay or Play Laws, ERISA
Preemption, and Potential Lessons from Massachusetts, 55 U. KAN. L. REv. 1203, 1203 (2007)
(recognizing state efforts to legislate health care reform around ERISA).
9. E.g., John Holahan & Johnny Kim, Why Does the Number of Uninsured Americans Continue to
Grow?, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2000, at 188, 189.
10. See generally Jonathan Oberlander, The US Health Care System: On a Road to Nowhere?, 167
CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 163, 163-65 (2002) (discussing constant efforts to alleviate drastic numbers
of uninsured Americans).
11. Monahan, supra note 8, at 1203.
12. Id.
13. JON 0. SHIMABUKURO & JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LEGAL ISSUES
RELATING TO STATE HEALTH CARE REGULATION: ERISA PREEMPTION AND FAIR SHARE LAWS 1
(2008).
14. See infra Parts Ill-IV.
15. See infra Part Ill.
16. See infra Part IV.
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More importantly, the debate over the relationship between ERISA
preemption and fair share laws implicates significant issues with respect to health
care reform at the local, state, and national levels. While the recent passage of
sweeping federal health care legislation makes it clear that states will be required to
provide some minimum level of health care benefits, 17 the extent to which they can
provide additional benefits funded by an employer spending mandate remains
unclear in light of existing ERISA preemption doctrine. In other words, while the
federal government has established the floor, ERISA sets the ceiling for the manner
in which state and local governments can improve access to health care. Thus, the
enactment of federal health care legislation does not reduce the necessity and
urgency for the U.S. Supreme Court to assess the validity of the San Francisco
Health Care Security Ordinance.
Absent intervention by the U.S Supreme Court in this matter, Congress
should consider amending ERISA to allow continued experimentation at the state
and local level. Since many of the benefits of the national health care law will not
be realized for several years, such a course of action would enable state and local
governments to continue to increase access to health care for the uninsured in the
short term. Similarly, looking at health care reform from a long-term perspective,
amending ERISA would provide state and local governments with the freedom and
flexibility to enact expanded or custom-tailored health care benefits that go beyond
the scope of the national legislation. This course of action would not only enhance
the federal government's efforts to implement a national model for health care
reform but it would also help to further reduce the gap between the uninsured and
access to health care.' 8
I. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 (ERISA)
By enacting ERISA, Congress established a regulatory framework that
applies to all employee benefit plans. Although the primary purpose of ERISA was
to regulate pension plans, health benefit plans also fall within the scope of the act. 19
The goals of ERISA "are to establish uniform national standards, safeguard
employee benefits from loss or abuse, and encourage employers to offer those
17. See, e.g., Alec Macilis, First Wave of Overhaul Will Inundate Insurers with New Rules:
Change Will Come More Slowly to Doctors, Hospitals, Consumers, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2010, at A8
(discussing various aspects of the recent health care reform legislation, including the changes to the
health insurance industry).
18. See infra Part II.
19. ERISA regulates "employee welfare benefit plans," which include employer health plans and
generally provides for hospital, medical, surgical, sickness, accident, disability, death, unemployment,
severance, or similar benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006). ERISA does not, however, regulate health
insurance purchased by individuals as individuals, including self-employed individuals or health benefits
not provided through employment-related group plans. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 § 514(a) (explaining application of ERISA is in reference to "employee benefit plans").
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benefits. 2 ° While ERISA does not mandate that employers offer benefit plans, in
the event that such plans are provided to employees, plan administrators are subject
21to strict requirements.
Currently, Hawaii is the only state that has received an exemption from
ERISA.22 This is primarily due to the fact that Hawaii enacted the Prepaid Health
Care Act of 1974 (PHCA) 23 shortly before congressional passage of ERISA in
1974.24 Under the PHCA, Hawaii included an employer mandate that required all
employers to provide a standard health package and pay for seventy-five percent of
its premium.25 In 1981, the Supreme Court ruled that ERISA preempted Hawaii's
legislation; 26 however, Congress responded in 1983 by amending ERISA and
granting Hawaii's PHCA an express and limited exemption from ERISA.27
A. Preemption Under ERISA Section 514(a)
Congress' principal goal under ERISA was to create a uniform set of
standards for employee benefit plans, thereby protecting employees by eliminating
the need for employers to adhere to inconsistent state and local regulations.28 In
order to achieve this goal of uniformity, ERISA includes an express preemption
provision, Section 514(a), which states that ERISA "shall supersede any and all
20. Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, ERISA Litigation and Physician Autonomy, 283 JAMA
921, 921 (2000); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (describing the congressional findings and policy reasons for
ERISA).
21. In particular, ERISA regulates reporting and disclosure, participation and vesting, funding, and
performance of fiduciary obligations. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §§ 101-414.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5).
23. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 393-I to -51 (2010).
24. Council of Hawaii Hotels v. Agsalud, 594 F. Supp. 449, 451-52 (D. Haw. 1984) (explaining
Congressional activity in passing exception under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-
149, at 999 (1997); 128 CONG. REC. H9,609-10 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1982).
25. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/HEHS-95-167, EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH
PLANS: ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES POSED BY ERISA 33 (1995), available at
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?HEHS-95-167. As part of Hawaii's "Prepaid Health Care" system,
PHCA "requires all employers ... to offer a health insurance plan" to its employees "that covers at least
a minimum set of specified benefits." CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, KEY ISSUES IN ANALYZING MAJOR
HEALTH INSURANCE PROPOSALS 50 box 2-3 (2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/
doc9924/12-18-Keylssues.pdf.
26. Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), afd, 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
27. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 25, at 50 box 2-3. According to Congressman Erlenbom,
the ERISA exemption granted to Hawaii was not to "be considered a precedent with respect to extending
similar treatment to any other State law." Council of Hawaii Hotels, 594 F. Supp. at 455 n.9.
28. See 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent) ("With the preemption of the field,
we ... eliminat[e] the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation."); id. at 29,933
(statement of Sen. Williams) ("It should be stressed that ... the narrow exceptions specified in the bill..
• are intended to preempt the field... , thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and
local regulation of employee benefit plans."); id. at 29,942 (statement of Sen. Javits) ("[T]he interests of
uniformity with respect to interstate plans required ... the displacement of State action in the field of
private employee benefit programs.").
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State laws insofar as they now or hereafter relate to any employee benefits plan
.... ,29 As a result, ERISA generally preempts state regulation of employment-
based health insurance and, in effect, "established the federal government as the
primary regulator of private-sector employee benefit plans. 3 °
Despite this broad preemption, ERISA Section 514 also includes a savings
clause and a deemer clause. Section 514(b)(2)(A), ERISA's savings clause,
explicitly preserves states' rights to regulate the business of insurance.
31
Specifically, ERISA will not "be construed to exempt or relieve any person from
any law of any State [that] regulates insurance ..... 32 Therefore, a state insurance
law might relate to employee benefit plans but nonetheless will not be preempted
by ERISA. Effectively, this provision protects state laws that directly regulate
insurance from federal preemption, thereby reinforcing the states' authority to
regulate insurance under the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945. 33 Section
514(b)(2)(B), ERISA's deemer clause, narrows the potential scope of the savings
clause.34 In general, the deemer clause provides that no employee benefit plan will
be deemed to be an insurer or in the insurance business (among other things) in
order to make such plans subject to state law and therefore avoid ERISA
preemption. As a result, the deemer clause restricts the extent to which state
insurance regulation can impact employee benefit plans and prevents states from
circumventing federal preemption under ERISA through the pretext of regulating
insurance.35
B. Judicial Interpretation of ERISA Preemption
With respect to preemption under ERISA, the critical inquiry is determining
whether, or to what extent, a state law "relate[s] to an[] employee benefit plan
... ,,36 As noted by the U.S. General Accounting Office, "ERISA preemption
language was sufficiently ambiguous that courts have had to elaborate on its
scope... [and] tried to delineate how closely state laws must relate to employer
health plans to be preempted., 37 A series of recent U.S. Supreme Court cases has
attempted to develop an analytical framework for determining whether state or
local law sufficiently "relates to" employee benefit plans so as to cause such laws
to be preempted by ERISA. Early cases interpreting Section 514(a) of ERISA
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
30. William Pierron & Paul Fronstin, ERISA Pre-emption: Implications for Health Reform and
Coverage, ISSUE BRIEF No. 314 (Empl. Ben. Res. Inst., Washington, DC), Feb. 2008, at 6.
31. 29 U.S.C. § l144(b)(2)(A).
32. Id.
33. Pierron & Fronstin, supra note 30, at 6.
34. 29 U.S.C. 1144(b)(2)(B).
35. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 25, at 32.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added).
37. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 25, at 6.
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applied the provision very broadly. In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,38 one of the
first cases to consider the scope of Section 514(a), the Supreme Court interpreted
the "relate to" language to include any provision having either "a connection with
or reference to" an employee benefits plan.39 A "reference to" a benefits plan that
will result in ERISA preemption arises "[w]here a State's law acts immediately and
exclusively upon ERISA plans... or where the existence of ERISA plans is
essential to the [state] law's operation . . . "40 Alternatively, a "connection with" an
employee benefits plan that gives rise to preemption under ERISA requires an
examination of "the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the
state law that Congress understood would survive, [and] ... the nature of the effect
of the state law on ERISA plans."41 The "connection with or reference to" test
adopted by the Supreme Court in Shaw assumes a very literal and expansive view
of preemption under Section 514(a) of ERISA. Although this view has maintained
much of its vitality over time, subsequent cases interpreting and applying Section
514(a) have narrowed its scope to some degree and signaled that its reach is not
limitless.
Most notably, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
v. Travelers Ins. Co.,42 "finally recognized the limits of ERISA preemption.... ,A3
In Travelers, the Supreme Court concluded that Section 514(a) did not preempt a
New York law requiring hospitals to charge different rates to insured, HMO, and
self-insured plans. 4 Taking a noticeable step back from its traditionally expansive
interpretation of ERISA preemption, the court reaffirmed the traditional principle
recognized in other areas of law that there is a "presumption that Congress does not
intend to supplant state law.' '45 To determine whether Congress intended to preempt
state law, the court examined "the structure and purpose of the Act .... 4 With
respect to federal preemption generally, where federal law is said to bar state action
in fields of traditional state regulation, the Supreme Court assumes that federal law
does not supersede states' historic police powers unless Congress clearly manifests
such a purpose in its legislation.47 In Travelers, the court specifically identified
health care as an area of traditional state regulation and suggested that a
38. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
39. Id. at 96-97.
40. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 324-25
(1997).
41. Id. at 325 (quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,656, 658-59 (1995) (internal quotations omitted)).
42. 514 U.S. 645.
43. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 337 (abr. 6th ed.
2008).
44. 514 U.S. at 667-68.
45. Id. at 654.
46. Id. at 655.
47. Id. at 655 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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congressional intent to preempt state law should not be presumed unless it was
"clear and manifest. 4 8 This examination led the court to conclude that "nothing in
the language of the Act or the context of its passage indicates that Congress chose
to displace general health care regulation, which historically has been a matter of
local concern." 49 Defining the purpose of ERISA as freeing employee benefit plans
from conflicting state and local regulations,5 ° the Court held that Congress intended
ERISA to preempt only state and local laws that operated directly on the structure
or administration of employee benefit plans. 51 Laws that only indirectly affected
employee benefit plans should not be preempted by ERISA.52 Therefore, while the
"decision did not delineate fully between state actions that are preempted and those
that are not," 53 it seemed to indicate that state regulation would be permissible
where it did not (1) conflict with the underlying objectives of ERISA or (2) impact
employee benefit plans too greatly.5 4 As the first Supreme Court case that narrowed
the scope of ERISA preemption, the U.S. General Accounting Office suggested
that the ruling would not only make states "likely to perceive that they have more
options and greater flexibility than previously recognized" in drafting laws
affecting employee benefit plans but also that such laws would "have to be judged
individually on the facts and circumstances in each case. 55
While Travelers scaled back the scope of ERISA preemption to some
degree,5 6 the decision did not provide a bright-line test as to when federal law
would preempt state or local law. Two years later, in De Buono v. NYSA-ILA
Medical & Clinical Services Fund,57 the Supreme Court permitted the state of New
York to impose a tax on gross receipts for patient services performed by medical
providers on a hospital owned and operated by an ERISA plan.58 Similar to
Travelers, the Court noted that the law regulated health and safety matters, "a field
... traditionally occupied by the States. 59 In addition, the Court concluded that
nothing in New York's law suggested it was the type of law that Congress intended
48. Id. at 655.
49. Id. at 661.
50. Id. at 656-57.
51. Id. at 657-58.
52. See generally id. at 658-64 (discussing the relationship between ERISA preemption and laws
that indirectly affect employee benefit plans).
53. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 25, at 7.
54. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 662, 668.
55. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 25, at 7-8.
56. "The [Supreme] Court's post-Travelers preemption cases suggest that the Court in fact turned a
comer in Travelers," as the Court "has rejected ERISA preemption in the majority of... cases" post-
Travelers but typically had not done so pre-Travelers. FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 337.
57. 520 U.S. 806 (1997).
58. Id. at 809-10.
59. Id. at 814-16.
[VOL. 13:423
ERISA AND NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM
ERISA to supersede.6 ° Ultimately, De Buono rejected an expansive, literal
interpretation of Section 514(a), holding that the tax at issue was one of "general
applicability."'6 1 While the Court acknowledged that the challenged law "impose[d]
some burdens on the administration of ERISA plans," the statute nevertheless had
only an incidental effect on employee benefit plans and did not "relate to [ERISA
plans] within the meaning of' ERISA; therefore, the challenged law did not affect
ERISA's objectives.62 When read in conjunction with the Travelers decision, the
De Buono opinion implies that a state or local law may survive ERISA preemption,
even if it imposes burdens of administration on ERISA plans, so long as the
challenged law is a law of general applicability and not the type of law that
Congress intended for ERISA to supersede.
In Kentucky Ass "n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller,63 a recent Supreme Court
case addressing ERISA preemption, a trade association brought a suit challenging
Kentucky's "any willing provider" law (AWP law).64 This law prohibited insurers
from discriminating against a health care provider willing to meet the insurer's
criteria for participation in the health plan by requiring health insurers and managed
care organizations to reimburse all licensed physicians or health professionals as
long as they were willing and qualified to participate in the insurer's network.65 In
the Sixth Circuit, a three-judge panel concluded that although Kentucky's AWP
law "related to" employee benefit plans, the AWP law only applied to directly
66insured plans; therefore, ERISA's savings clause prevented federal preemption.
The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the Sixth Circuit ruling, holding that a
state law is deemed to regulate insurance under Section 514(b)(2)(B) if it satisfies
the following requirements: the state law must (1) "be specifically directed toward
entities engaged in insurance" and (2) "substantially affect the risk pooling
arrangement between the insurer and the insured.' 67 This new two-part test
departed from the traditional approach taken by the Supreme Court in interpreting
Section 514(b)(2)(A),68 significantly clarifying and expanding, the scope of
60. Id. at 814.
61. Id. at 815-16; see also New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995) (focusing its analysis on the question of a laws general
applicability).
62. De Buono, 520 U.S. at 815-16 (internal quotations omitted).
63. 538 U.S. 329 (2003).
64. Id. at 332.
65. Id. at 332-34. Kentucky's AWP law required reimbursement regardless of whether an insurer
actually had a contractual relationship with the licensed physician or health care professional. Id at 332.
66. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Nichols, 227 F.3d 352, 360, 372 (6th Cir. 2000).
67. Ky. Ass 'n, 538 U.S. at 342. According to the court, Kentucky's AWP law satisfied both prongs
of this test and, therefore, was not preempted by ERISA. Id.
68. Historically, to determine whether the savings clause protected a state law from ERISA
preemption, the Supreme Court had applied a "common sense test" and also examined whether the
challenged law regulated the "business of insurance" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act's multi-factored
test. A state law regulates the business of insurance if it (1) has the effect of transferring or spreading the
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ERISA's savings clause. Effectively, "the court abandoned its earlier precedents
and crafted a new approach to interpreting the savings clause. 69 Under the
analytical framework articulated by the Supreme Court in Kentucky Ass'n,
ERISA's savings clause would appear to protect any state law that requires insurers
to provide particular benefits.70
The Supreme Court decisions in Travelers, DeBuono, and Kentucky Ass'n
indicate a gradual shift toward a more narrow judicial interpretation of ERISA
preemption. Nonetheless, Section 514(a) is still generally considered to broadly
preempt state and local law, and ERISA remains "a significant barrier to state
health care reform. 71 In effect, the expansive reach of Section 514(a) has
constrained experimentation with health care reform at the state and local level. In
particular, ERISA preemption has proved to be a formidable challenge to fair share
laws enacted by state and local governments in Maryland, Suffolk County, NY, and
San Francisco, CA in an effort to provide uninsured residents with access to health
care.
72
II. UNINSURED & ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE
In 2007, an estimated 45 million Americans under the age of 65 did not have
health insurance.73 In 2008, the Congressional Budget Office projected that
approximately "one in six nonelderly people in the United States [would] be
without health insurance at any given time during 2009. ' ' 7 The incremental cost of
health insurance for low-wage workers is relatively high; 75 therefore, those most
policyholder's risk, (2) is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured,
and (3) is limited to entities within the insurance industry that could be included under the savings
clause. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1987) (recounting and applying the
McCarran-Ferguson test); Metro. Life Ins. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743 (1985) (reviewing the
McCarran-Ferguson factors).
69. FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 338.
70. Id.; see also Matthew 0. Gatewood, Note, The New Map: The Supreme Court's New Guide to
Curing Thirty Years of Confusion in ERISA Savings Clause Analysis, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 643, 648
(2005) (discussing the role of the savings clause in ERISA preemption analysis).
71. FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 340.
72. See infra Parts III-IV.
73. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER-KEY FACTS ABOUT
AMERICANS WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE 1 (2008) [hereinafter KAISER UNINSURED PRIMER].
Between 2003 and 2007, the number of uninsured individuals in the U.S. increased approximately 1.6%.
HEALTH RESEARCH INST., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, TOP NINE HEALTH INDUSTRY ISSUES IN 2009:
OUTSIDE FORCES WILL DISRUPT THE INDUSTRY 2 (2009) [hereinafter PWC INDUSTRY ISSUES 2009].
74. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 25, at 27.
75. Jack Hadley et al., Covering the Uninsured in 2008: Current Costs, Sources of Payment, and
Incremental Costs, 27 HEALTH AFF. w399, w408 (2008), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/
27/5/w399.
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likely to be uninsured will be least able to pay for their own health care.76 Whether
the uninsured receive health care will depend upon a combination of where each
uninsured patient lives, the care needed, and what organizations are willing to pay
for such care.77 Rising health care costs have made health care coverage less
affordable or even prohibitively expensive for many individuals and employers,
contributing to both the growing number of uninsured as well as a decreased level
of access to care 8.7 In 2007, employer-sponsored health insurance accounted for the
majority of insured individuals; 79 however, many businesses do not offer health
benefits to their employees.8 ° In addition, the number of employers offering
employer-sponsored coverage has either stalled or declined over the past decade. 81
With respect to the relationship between the uninsured and access to care, studies
indicate that lack of health care coverage reduces access to care and results in
unmet need for such care, regardless of the length of time that one is uninsured.
82
During the economic downturn at the start of the decade, "nonelderly
Americans with employer-sponsored health insurance decreased for the first time
since 1993, dropping from [sixty-six percent] in 2000 to [sixty-one percent] by
2004. "83 As suggested by historical experience, a declining economy will result in a
greater number of individuals becoming unemployed, self-employed, or working in
smaller firms; under all of these scenarios, the number of uninsured will
presumably increase. According to a recent study by the Kaiser Commission on
Medicaid and the Uninsured, a one-percent increase in the unemployment rate in
2008 would result in a 1.1 million increase in the number of uninsured.84 Similarly,
76. Jean S. Fraser, CEO, San Francisco Health Plan, Presentation at Universal Healthcare Council:
Covering San Francisco: Private and Public Coverage and the Gaps (Feb. 23, 2006), available at
http://www.sfhp.org/files/presentations[UACoveringSF-2-23-06.pdf.
77. HEALTH RESEARCH INST., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, HEALTHCARE POLICY IN AN OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION: DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE OF UNIVERSAL COVERAGE 14 (2008) [hereinafter
PWC HEALTHCARE POLICY].
78. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH CARE COSTS: A PRIMER-KEY INFORMATION ON
HEALTH CARE COSTS AND THEIR IMPACT 1 (2009) [hereinafter KAISER HEALTH CARE COSTS PRIMER];
KAISER UNINSURED PRIMER, supra note 73, at 8.
79. In 2007, 159 million Americans, or sixty-one percent of the nonelderly population, were
covered by employer-sponsored health insurance. KAISER UNINSURED PRIMER, supra note 73, at 15.
80. Id. at 15-16 & fig.16. Small firms, in particular, are generally less likely to provide coverage in
comparison to larger firms. Id. at 16.
81. Id. at 15. Employer-sponsored health insurance is especially sensitive to changes in the
economy and health insurance premiums. Id. The economic downturn in early 2001, combined with
double-digit inflation in health insurance premiums, resulted in a decrease in employer-sponsored
coverage. Id. More recently, growth of health insurance premiums has slowed, but the percentage of
individuals covered by employer-sponsored insurance has not increased. Id.
82. Id. at 8.
83. Id. at 13.
84. STAN DORN ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID, SCHIP, AND ECONOMIC
DOWNTURN: POLICY CHALLENGES AND POLICY RESPONSES 5 (2008), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7770.pdf.
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a downward shift in incomes associated with falling economic conditions will
result in a greater number of low-income individuals, "where uninsured rates are
the highest. '85 Since the number of uninsured will undoubtedly continue to multiply
at increasing rates in the near-term, the need to institute health care reform that
addresses the twin problems of the uninsured and access to health care is critical.
Notwithstanding this pressing need, ERISA serves as a formidable obstacle to state
and local efforts to expand health care coverage.
III. FAIR SHARE LAWS
Several state and local governments have turned to fair share laws as one
possible solution to the problem of the uninsured and the failure to achieve
comprehensive health care reform at the national level. Fair share laws generally
require employers to pay into a state fund if employers (1) "pay less than a
specified percentage of their payroll[] toward" employee health benefits or (2) do
not provide any health insurance coverage for their employees.86 As a result, such
laws require employers to either provide a minimum level of health benefits for
their employees or help to offset the cost of public health care coverage provided
by the state or locality.87
For example, in April 2006, Massachusetts enacted a law that required all
residents of the state to have health insurance.8 8 The Massachusetts program is
funded in part by an employer spending mandate; employers with eleven or more
employees must either provide health insurance coverage for their employees or
contribute up to $295 annually per employee to the state.8 9 So far, no ERISA
preemption suit has been brought against Massachusetts' health care reform statute
and its employer spending mandate.90 The lack of a legal challenge may be
attributable to the strong support from leading business groups for the state's
reform initiative; alternatively, it might be due to the fact that the minimum health
care expenditure amount imposed by Massachusetts' law is much smaller relative
85. KAISER UNINSURED PRIMER, supra note 73, at 13.
86. Pierron & Fronstin, supra note 30, at 12.
87. Id. Also commonly referred to as pay or play statutes, these laws generally require employers to
choose between either paying a certain amount for health care expenditures or coverage on behalf of
their employees (the play option) or making contributions to a state or locality to offset the costs of
medical expenses for uninsured residents (the pay option). Id.
88. 2006 Mass. Acts Ch. 58. According to a study by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,
Massachusetts' health care reform has resulted in the nation's lowest uninsured rate in the country; the
state recently reported that its uninsured rate dropped to three percent compared with fifteen percent
nationally. PWC HEALTHCARE POLICY, supra note 77, at 11.
89. Pierron & Fronstin, supra note 30, at 12.
90. PWC HEALTHCARE POLICY, supra note 77, at 17 fig.7; see also Mary Ann Chirba-Martin &
Andrrs Torres, Universal Health Care in Massachusetts: Setting the Standard for National Reform, 35
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 409, 441 (2008) ("[l]t is too soon to tell whether the possibility of an ERISA
preemption claim will become a reality.").
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to other fair share programs.9' Nonetheless, speculation persists as to whether
Massachusetts' employer spending mandate will be subject to an ERISA challenge
and, if so, whether it would survive such a challenge.92
Despite the notable absence of an ERISA preemption suit against
Massachusetts' health care reform law, other states and localities have not been as
fortunate. In particular, Maryland and Suffolk County, NY both attempted to
implement their own fair share laws.93 However, in each instance, a retail trade
association brought a suit challenging the law under ERISA, and the court
ultimately found that ERISA preempted the fair share law in question.
A. Maryland-Fair Share Health Care Fund Act
In January 2006, Maryland enacted the Fair Share Health Care Fund Act (Fair
Share Act).9 4 This legislation required for-profit employers with 10,000 or more
employees in Maryland to either spend at least eight percent of total payroll costs
on employee health insurance costs9 5 or pay the state the amount that those
employers' spending fell short of that threshold percentage. 96 However, shortly
after the Fair Share Act was enacted, the Retail Industry Leaders Association
(RILA), a trade association that included Wal-Mart as a member, brought a suit
challenging the law on the grounds that it was preempted by ERISA.97 Ultimately,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court decision, which concluded that Section
514(a) of ERISA preempted the Fair Share Act.
98
The state made two arguments in defense of upholding the Fair Share Act: (1)
the law was a statute of general applicability and (2) did not have a "connection
91. John McDonough et al., A Progress Report on State Health Access Reform, 27 HEALTH AFF.
w114 (2008), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.27.2.wl05vl; see also
Phyllis C. Borzi, There's "Private" and Then There's "Private": ERISA, Its Impact, and Options for
Reform, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICs 660, 666 n. 51 (2008) ("It is possible that employers saw sufficient
potential benefit to them from reform that they decided not to challenge it or that the burdens imposed
by the Massachusetts law were not sufficiently great to justify the expense of litigation.").
92. See, e.g., Joan Indiana Rigdon, Universal Health Care?, WASHINGTON LAWYER, Aug. 2008,
http://www.dcbar.org/for-lawyers/resources/publications/washington-lawyer/august-2 00 8/universal-he
alth.cfm (discussing the possibility that an ERISA challenge will be made to the Massachusetts law).
93. See infra Part L.A-B.
94. 2006 Md. Laws I.
95. Id. at 3-4. The statute defined health insurance costs as "the amount paid by an employer to
provide health care or health insurance to employees in [Maryland] to the extent the costs may be
deductible by an employer under federal tax law." Id. at 3.
96. Id. at 4.
97. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481,484 (D. Md. 2006).
98. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n, v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007). In addition, the U.S.
Department of Labor filed an amicus brief in November 2006 in support of RILA and ERISA
preemption of the Fair Share Act. See Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Plaintiff-Appellee and Requesting Affirmance, Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th
Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06-1840, 06-1901).
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with" employee benefit plans.99 Presumably, under De Buono, a law of general
applicability may survive an ERISA preemption challenge. 100 In support of this
argument, the state contended that the revenue obtained under the minimum
spending requirement would fund the Fair Share Health Care Fund, which was
established under the Fair Share Act and would be used to offset costs under the
Maryland Medical Assistance Program.'0 ' With regard to whether the Fair Share
Act had a "connection with" employee benefit plans, the state argued that no such
connection existed because employers could act in ways that did not involve
employee benefit plans but satisfied the minimum spending requirement imposed
by the Fair Share Act.'0 2 For example, an employer could establish on-site medical
clinics, contribute more money to employees' health savings accounts, or not
increase benefits under any ERISA plan and simply pay the difference between
existing ERISA benefit spending and the eight percent required under the Fair
Share Act.'
0 3
The Fourth Circuit rejected both arguments presented by the state and
concluded that ERISA preempted the Fair Share Act. 04 One critical issue with
respect to the Fair Share Act is the extent to which it directly impacted Wal-Mart
while not affecting either large nonprofit employers or other for-profit employers
operating within the state. 0 5 Under Maryland's law, Wal-Mart would have been
the only for-profit employer in the state subject to the Fair Share Act
requirements.10 6 Before enacting the Fair Share Act, state legislators considered
testimony that reported rising costs within the Maryland Medical Assistance
Program, which provided access to health care for Maryland's low income
residents. 0 7 In addition, the General Assembly reviewed information showing Wal-
Mart failed to provide adequate health benefits to its employees. 10 8 For example,
Wal-Mart employed 16,000 workers in Maryland, many of whom received
inadequate health care coverage or no coverage at all.'0 9 This led many Wal-Mart
employees and dependents to enroll in Medicaid and the Maryland's Children's
99. Fielder, 475 F.3d at 194-95.
100. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
101. Fielder, 475 F.3d at 190.
102. Id. at 194-95.
103. See id. at 195 (identifying the choices available to businesses under the Maryland law).
104. Id. at 197.
105. See id. at 185 (comparing the Fair Share Act's impact on Walmart as compared with non-profit
employers).
106. Id. Other for-profit employers with at least 10,000 employees in Maryland either satisfied the
eight percent spending threshold or were exempted from the Fair Share Act. Id.
107. Id. at 183.
108. Id. at 183-84.
109. See id. at 183-84 (discussing the Maryland legislature's finding that Wal-Mart only provides
coverage to forty-five percent of its workforce, and that many employees and their families receive
outside assistance for healthcare).
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Health Insurance Program.1 ° Based on the legislative history of the act, the court
found that the Fair Share Act "could hardly be intended to function as a revenue act
of general application," rejecting the state's argument in that regard."'
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit found the Fair Share Act had an impermissible
"connection with" employee benefit plans." 2 In Travelers, the Supreme Court
upheld the law at issue, finding that it merely created an "indirect economic
influence" on employers with respect to employee benefit plans." 3 In contrast, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that the Fair Share Act "directly regulate[d] employers'
structuring of their employee health benefit plans."'" 4 As a result, "the only rational
choice" for an employer subject to the Fair Share Act requirements was "to
structure their ERISA healthcare benefit plans so as to meet the minimum spending
threshold."".5 Alternatives to increase spending suggested by the state were not
sufficient to avoid ERISA preemption. The options provided by Maryland's law
were "not meaningful alternatives by which an employer [could] increase
healthcare spending to comply with the Fair Share Act without affecting its ERISA
plans."' 16 In the court's opinion, it was unrealistic and impractical to assume that
employers would be able to differentiate between ERISA and non-ERISA health
care spending as isolated and unrelated costs. 1 7 Since "[d]ecisions regarding one
would affect the other and thereby violate ERISA's preemption provisions," a
prohibited "connection with" ERISA plans existed under Maryland's law.18
Having lost at both the district court and appellate court levels, Maryland's
Attorney General concluded a reversal was highly unlikely and decided not to seek
review of the Fourth Circuit decision by the Supreme Court.' 9 Post-Fielder, it
110. See id. at 184 (describing Maryland's legislative response to the dilemma).
111. Id. at 194.
[L]egislators and interested parties uniformly understood the Act as requiring Wal-Mart to
increase its healthcare spending. If this is not the Act's effect, one would have to conclude,
which we do not, that the Maryland legislature misunderstood the nature of the bill that it
carefully drafted and debated. For these reasons, the amount that the Act prescribes for
payment to the State is actually a fee or penalty that gives the employer an irresistible
incentive to provide its employees with a greater level of health benefits.
Id.
112. Id. at 197.
113. Id. at 195 (quoting N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 659 (1995)) (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 193.
116. Id. at 196 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 197.
118. Id.
119. Maryland Attorney General Will Not Seek Supreme Court Review of 'Fair Share' Law, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 73, at A-9 (Apr. 17, 2007).
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would seem clear that "a direct mandate requiring employers to offer specified
coverage to their employees is out of the question."'
20
B. Suffolk County, NY-Fair Share for Health Care Act
In October 2005, Suffolk County, NY passed the Suffolk County Fair Share
for Health Care Act (Suffolk County Act). 12' As originally enacted, the Suffolk
County Act required certain large retail stores selling groceries 22 to make "health
care expenditures"' 123 "equivalent to not less than $3.00 per hour worked by...
employees in Suffolk County[, NY].' ' 124 Four categories of non-ERISA health care
expenditures could satisfy the employer spending mandate: (1) contributions by the
employer to a health savings account, (2) reimbursement by the employer of health
care expenses incurred by an employee or its family members, (3) expenditures
incurred by the employer to provide a health clinic or any health-related services in
the workplace, and (4) contributions by the employer to any federally funded health
center or other community center.125 If covered employers failed to satisfy the
mandated expenditures, the Suffolk County Act required such employers to pay a
civil penalty to the county. 126 The Act was later amended, redefining the health care
expenditures requirement as equivalent to the "public health care cost rate
multiplied by the total number of hours worked" by employees in Suffolk County,
NY. 27 The "public health care cost rate" was defined under the law as "a rate that
approximates the cost to the public health care system of providing health care to
one uninsured employee."'
' 28
120. FURROW, supra note 43, at 345.
121. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 406 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
122. Suffolk County, N.Y., Reg. Local Law No. 30-2005, § 352-2 (Sept. 27, 2005). "Covered
employers" are defined as:
[A]ny person that operates at least one retail store located in Suffolk County where groceries
or other foods are sold for off-site consumption and where either (1) twenty-five thousand
square feet or more of the store's selling area floor space is used for the sale of groceries or
other foods for off-site consumption, or (2) 3% or more of the store's selling area floor space
is used for the sale of groceries or other foods for off-site consumption and the store contains
at least 100,000 square feet of selling area floor space, or (3) [the retail store] had total
annual revenues of $1 billion or more in the most recent calendar year and the sale of
groceries comprise more than 20% of a company's revenue.
Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
123. The law defined health care expenditures as "any amount paid by a covered employer to
employees or to another party for the purpose of providing health care services or reimbursing the cost
of such services for employees or family of employees." Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
124. Id. at 406.
125. Id. at 407.
126. Id. at 406. Initially, covered employers were also required to make up the shortfall; however,
this was later repealed. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. Under the law, Suffolk County's Department of Labor was required to publish the official
public health care cost rate by October 1 of each year. Id.
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Similar to the Fielder decision, the legislative history of the Suffolk County
Act and its particular impact on Wal-Mart played a critical role in the disposition of
the Suffolk County case. The act "expressly acknowledge[d] a legislative intent to
protect small retailers in Suffolk County from large employers who do not provide
health care for employees."'1 29 In addition, Wal-Mart met the definition of a
"covered employer" under the Suffolk County Act "because it operate[d] stores in
Suffolk County in which groceries and other foods [were] sold for offsite
consumption and ... ha[d] total annual revenue more than $1 billion with at least
[twenty percent] of that revenue produced by the sale of groceries.' 130 Several
sponsors of the Suffolk County Act expressed a desire not only to protect small
businesses but also to have a direct effect on Wal-Mart's operations in Suffolk
County. 131 Most notably, Legislator Foley expressed concerns "about the looming
threat of Wal-Mart type stores that have wreaked havoc in a number of
communities."' 132 Similarly, in dramatic fashion, Legislator Tonna described a
scene from a movie where an entire town had collapsed as a result of one
individual's actions and suggested that "if you look around the communities of the
United States, you see that's what Wal-Mart has done.' 33 It is no surprise that
almost immediately after the Suffolk County Act was enacted, RILA challenged
the law on the basis of ERISA preemption.'
34
In defense of its law, Suffolk County argued that a local "law is not
preempted by ERISA where the existence of a plan is not necessary to be in
compliance with the [local] law."'135 The county contended that the existence or
modification of an ERISA plan was not necessary under the Suffolk County Act
due to the fact that employers could achieve compliance with the law through four
categories of non-ERISA expenditures expressly identified under the law as
satisfying the employer spending mandate. 136 In addition, the county asserted that
the primary purpose of its law was to reduce the county's financial burden of
subsidizing health care for residents; since containing health care costs is a
traditional area of state regulation, the county maintained that ERISA did not
preempt its fair share law.
13 7
129. Id. at 408. The Suffolk County Act stated that "historically, most retail employers in Suffolk
County have provided paid health care for their employees and families but mounting competitive
pressures from large employers who do not follow this practice have forced many Suffolk retail
employers to eliminate health care coverage." Id.
130. Id.
131. See id. (noting that the legislature expressly considered the impact of the proposed legislation




135. Id. at 409-10.
136. Id. at 410.
137. Id. at 409.
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The district court commented that it was not bound by the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Fielder several months earlier; nonetheless, the district court noted that
the Suffolk County Act was substantially similar to Maryland's Fair Share Act.
138
Thus, stating that it was "in accord with the Fourth Circuit's well reasoned and
comprehensive analysis"' 139 in Fielder, the district court held that ERISA preempted
Suffolk County's fair share law. 140 The district court asserted that the only rational
choice for covered employers was "to structure their ERISA health care benefit
plans to meet the minimum spending threshold" required by the Suffolk County
Act.141 Despite the Suffolk County Act providing alternatives by which employers
could satisfy the minimum spending requirement, the district court found these
options did not constitute "meaningful alternatives," maintaining that the
alternative options were unrealistic and would be difficult for covered employers to
actually utilize. 142 Once those options for compliance with the Suffolk County Act
were eliminated, "all that [was] left [was] for covered employers... to increase
contributions to ERISA plans.' ' 143 Much like Fielder, the district court also noted
that the legislative history made it clear that the Suffolk County Act was targeted at
Wal-Mart, concluding that "Suffolk County enacted [its law] in order to mandate
that covered employers and specifically, Wal-Mart, increase spending on healthcare
coverage for Suffolk County employees."' 44 The district court also expressed
concern that the Suffolk County Act would disrupt uniform plan administration,
resulting in differing state regulations and "impos[ing] precisely the burden that
ERISA pre-emption was intended to avoid."' 145 Based on the aforementioned
factors, the district court found that the Suffolk County Act obviously had a
prohibited connection with employee benefit plans and was therefore preempted by
Section 514(a) of ERISA. 146
IV. SAN FRANCISCO-HEALTHY SAN FRANCISCO
San Francisco has had a long history of seeking to improve the health care
delivery system for its uninsured residents. 47 Beginning in the mid-1990's the city
launched initiatives to provide high quality medical care to the largest possible
138. Id. at 416.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 418.
141. Id. at 417.
142. Id. at 417-18.
143. Id. at 418.
144. Id. at 417.
145. Id. at 418 (quoting Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141,150 (2001)).
146. Id. at 419.
147. HEALTHY SAN FRANCISCO, HEALTHY SAN FRANCISCO PROGRAM IN-DEPTH 3 (n.d.), available
at http://www.healthysanfrancisco.org/files/PDF/HSFProgram-ln-Depth.pdf'
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number of low-income residents. 148 Shortly thereafter, in 1998, San Francisco
voters approved an initiative encouraging health care expansion to the city's
uninsured residents. 149 In February 2006, the city "established the multi-
disciplinary Universal Healthcare Council [(UHC)] to explore expansion of health
care access to all of San Francisco's [uninsured] residents.' 150 Ultimately, the UHC
developed a framework for implementing such a program, and in July 2006, the
city of San Francisco adopted its own fair share law.1 51 Thus, San Francisco
became the first city in the U.S. to implement a program designed to provide all of
its uninsured residents with universal access to health care.152 Initially referred to as
the San Francisco Health Access Program, the program has come to be known as
Healthy San Francisco.153
Unlike many other health care reform efforts, Healthy San Francisco is not
health insurance. 154 Instead, the program provides each participant with the
following: (1) a "medical home;" (2) a primary care provider; and, (3) access to
specialty care, urgent and emergency care, mental health care, substance abuse
services, laboratory, inpatient hospitalization, radiology, and pharmaceuticals. 15  In
order to receive care, a participant must be a resident of the city of San Francisco
and is limited to receiving care through the Healthy San Francisco program within
the city. 156 Healthy San Francisco began by targeting the most vulnerable segment
of San Francisco's uninsured population. Residents whose income was at or below
100% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) were the first to be eligible to enroll in
148. See id. at 3-4 (identifying the major initiatives enacted by the city). Most notably, the city and
county of San Francisco established the San Francisco Health Plan in 1997, which initially served the
Medi-Cal population in a managed care setting; however, the plan was created with a vision toward
helping to provide high quality medical care to the largest possible number of low-income residents in
the city and county of San Francisco. Id. at 3.
149. Id. at 3. Partnering with the San Francisco Health Plan, the city launched several initiatives
targeted toward certain segments of San Francisco's uninsured population. Id. These initiatives included
health insurance programs for low-income children and youth not eligible for public programs and
requiring all city and county contractors to provide health insurance to their employees. Id.
150. Id.
151. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & County of S.F., 535 F. Supp. 2d 968, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2007);
see also S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE, SAN FRANCISCO HEALTH CARE SECURITY ORDINANCE § 14.1-.8
(2006) (outlining the payment requirements and other provisions of the fair share law).
152. Elena Conis & Carol Medlin, San Francisco Health Access Program Update, HEALTH POL'Y
MONITOR, April 2008, http://www.hpm.org/en/Surveys/IGH__-_USA/I I/SanFrancisco-_HealthAccess
_ProgramUpdate.html?contentid=1570&language=en; see also HEALTHY SAN FRANCISCO, supra
note 147, at 6 (explaining that the San Francisco program "represents the first time a local government
has sought to provide universal health care to its residents").
153. HEALTHY SAN FRANCISCO, supra note 147, at 3. The program is officially titled the San
Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance. § 14. 1(a)
154. § 14.2(a) (stating that program is not an insurance plan within the confines of the San Francisco
ordinance); see also HEALTHY SAN FRANCISCO, supra note 147, at 3.
155. § 14.2(e)-(f); HEALTHY SAN FRANCISCO, supra note 147, at 8.
156. § 14.2; see also HEALTHY SAN FRANCISCO, supra note 147, at 7 (summarizing the eligibility
requirements).
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Healthy San Francisco.' 57 As of January 2008, eligibility was expanded to include
San Francisco residents whose income was at or below 300% of the FPL. 58 The
Healthy San Francisco program started by enrolling several hundred patients at two
Chinatown clinics in July 2007; since that time, the program has expanded to
include twenty-seven participating clinics and has added roughly 1,500 participants
per month.159 When Healthy San Francisco was enacted, San Francisco had an
estimated uninsured population of 82,000 residents;1 60 as of May 2010, more than
52,000 residents had enrolled in Healthy San Francisco.' 61 Of the 82,000 residents
initially identified as uninsured, approximately 46,000 of those residents were
employed but lacked health insurance.' 62 Based on a study conducted by the San
Francisco Health Plan, 163 the majority of employed individuals without health care
coverage cited their employer not offering health benefits as the reason for being
uninsured.' 64 Other reported reasons included either not being eligible for
coverage 165 or declining to accept coverage offer by an employer, 166 presumably
due to the high cost of contribution to the employer's health plan.
At the time of enactment, Healthy San Francisco was expected to cost
approximately $200 million per year or slightly more than $2,400 per year for each
uninsured resident. 67 In order to finance universal access to health care for San
Francisco's uninsured residents, Healthy San Francisco relies on a combination of
four major funding sources: 168 city funds, 169 state funds,170 individual premiums and
157. HEALTHY SAN FRANCISCO, supra note 147, at 4.
158. Id.
159. Id.; HEALTHY SAN FRANCISCO, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE SAN FRANCISCO HEALTH
COMMISSION (FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008-09) 8 (2009).
160. UNIVERSAL HEALTHCARE COUNCIL, SAN FRANCISCO HEALTH ACCESS PROGRAM: SERVING
UNINSURED ADULTS 3 (2006) [hereinafter UHC REPORT], available at http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/
healthpolicy/uhc-report.pdf.
161. Healthy San Francisco, About Us: Program Stats, http://www.healthysanfrancisco.org/
about-us/Stats.aspx# (last visited May 16, 2010).
162. SAN FRANCISCO HEALTH PLAN, ABOUT THE NUMBERS: A PROFILE OF UNINSURED ADULTS IN
SAN FRANCISCO 5-6 (2006) [hereinafter SFHP ABOUT THE NUMBERS], available at
http://www.sfhp.org/files/PDF/SFHAP/2006_ProfileofUinsuredinSF.pdf.
163. San Francisco Health Plan is a city-sponsored health plan that provides health insurance for
approximately 55,000 residents of San Francisco, separate and apart from Healthy San Francisco. See
San Francisco Health Plan, About Us: Who We Are, available at http://www.sfhp.org/about--us/
who._weare/ (last visited May 16, 2010).
164. SFHP ABOUT THE NUMBERS, supra note 162, at 8. Sixty-nine percent of uninsured workers
cited this as the reason for being uninsured. Id.
165. This reason accounted for fifteen percent of uninsured workers in San Francisco. Id.
166. Approximately seventeen percent of uninsured workers claimed this as the reason why they
were uninsured. Id.
167. UHC REPORT, supra note 160, at 4. These figures are based on the estimated cost of SFHAP in
2006 dollars and the number of uninsured residents as of 2006. Id.
168. Id. at 9-10; see also HEALTHY SAN FRANCISCO, supra note 147, at 16 (listing the major
funding sources)
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copayments, 171 and mandatory employer contributions.172 Payments made by
covered employers pursuant to Section 14.3 of the Health Care Security Ordinance
cover about a quarter of Healthy San Francisco's annual CoSt. 73 Essentially, under
the Healthy San Francisco definition for "covered employer,"' 74 any for-profit
business operating in San Francisco and employing twenty or more people or any
nonprofit corporation operating in San Francisco and employing fifty or more
people is required to either provide health care coverage for its employees or pay a
fee to the city to help finance the Healthy San Francisco program. 75 If an employer
chooses to provide health care coverage for its employees, then it must meet a
minimum spending requirement established by Healthy San Francisco. 176 In
particular, smaller companies are required to spend roughly $200 per employee per
month, and larger companies are required to spend roughly $300 per employee per
month. 7 7 In the event that a covered employer decides not to provide health care
coverage for its employees at the minimum amounts established by the ordinance,
169. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE, SAN FRANCISCO HEALTH CARE SECURITY ORDINANCE § 14.2(d)
(2006). A portion SFHP's cost is covered by the $104 million per year that the city previously paid to
provide emergency care and other services to its uninsured residents. Conis & Medlin, supra note 152.
170. Conis & Medlin, supra note 152. In 2007, SFHP received an award of $73 million from the
state health department to be apportioned over three years. Id.
171. § 14.2(d). Enrollees are required to pay quarterly participant fees and point of service fees at
rates determined by their level of income. Id. §§ 14.2(d), 14.3; Conis & Medlin, supra note 152.
172. §§ 14.2(d), 14.3.
173. Conis & Medlin, supra note 152.
174. The ordinance defines covered employer as:
[A]ny medium-sized or large business .. .engaging in business within the [c]ity [of San
Francisco] ... or, in the case of a nonprofit corporation, an employer for which an average of
fifty (50) or more persons per week perform work for compensation during a quarter. Small
businesses are not "covered employers" and are exempt from the health care spending
requirements under Section 14.3 [of the Health Care Security Ordinance].
§ 14.1(b)(3). A large business is defined as "an employer for which an average of one hundred (100) or
more persons per week perform work for compensation during a quarter," id. § 14.1(b)(l 1), while a
medium-sized business means "an employer for which an average of between twenty (20) and ninety-
nine (99) persons per week perform work for compensation during a quarter." Id. § 14. 1(b)(12).
175. Id. §§ 14. l (b)(3), (7)-(8), 14.3. Self-employed individuals, independent contractors, employers
with nineteen or fewer employees total (including any employees located outside of San Francisco), and
nonprofits with forty-nine or fewer employees total (including any employees located outside of San
Francisco) are not covered by the Health Care Security Ordinance. Id. §§ 14.1(b)(3), 14.3; Labor
Standards Enforcement, City & County of San Francisco, Health Care Security Ordinance (HCSO),
http:tlsfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=418 (last visited May 16,2010).
176. § 14.1(b)(8); see also Conis & Medlin, supra note 152 (stating that San Francisco businesses
must either provide minimum coverage to its employees or pay a fee to the City to finance Healthy San
Francisco).
177. Conis & Medlin, supra note 152. SFHAP spending per enrollee is estimated to be
approximately $200 per month. Id.
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then such employers must pay fees ranging from $1.23 per employee per hour for
medium-sized businesses and $1.85 per employee per hour for large businesses.'
8
An employer subject to Healthy San Francisco's requirements must only
make required health care expenditures on behalf of its covered employees. 7 9 Such
expenditures must be made quarterly and are calculated based on the total number
of hours worked by covered employees multiplied by the health care expenditure
rate. 180 Similar to the Suffolk County Act, certain expenditures are expressly
identified under Healthy San Francisco as complying with a covered employer's
required health care expenditures. 8 1 Qualifying health care expenditures include
the following: (1) employer contributions to a health savings account, (2) employer
reimbursement of employee expenses incurred in purchasing health care services,
(3) employer payments to a third party for the purpose of providing health care
services for employees, (4) costs incurred by an employer in the direct delivery of
health care to its employees, and (5) employer payments to the city of San
Francisco to be used on behalf of its employees. 82 In addition to the health care
expenditure requirements, a covered employer must also satisfy certain record
keeping and reporting requirements under Healthy San Francisco. 83
A. Small Business Opposition to Healthy San Francisco
Similar to other health care reform efforts attempting to implement fair share
laws, Healthy San Francisco has not come without challenges from affected
employers.' 84 The mandatory employer contribution component has faced fierce
opposition from the San Francisco business community in general and small
businesses in particular.'85 Small businesses have argued that Healthy San
178. HEALTHY SAN FRANCISCO, supra note 147, at 5 tbl. I. The initial health care expenditure rate
was set at $1.06 per employee per hour for medium-sized businesses and $1.60 per hour for large
businesses from the effective date of the ordinance through June 30, 2007; thereafter, the health care
expenditure rate increased by five percent over the calculated expenditure for the previous year.
§ 14.1(b)(8)(a)-(b). The first increase incurred on July 1, 2007, followed by subsequent increases on
January 1 of each following year. Id. § 14.1(b)(8)(b). As of January 1, 2010, the health care expenditure
rate will be determined annually based upon an annual ten-county survey of the "average contribution"
for a full-time employee to the City Health Service System. § 14. I(b)(8)(c).
179. Id. § 14.3(a). Under the San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance, covered employee
includes any person, regardless of residence, who works in San Francisco for a covered employer, either
full- or part-time, for at least eight hours per week (as of January 1, 2009), and for at least ninety days.
Id. § 14.1(b)(2). The term covered employee does not include certain classes of employees, such as
managerial or supervisorial employees (subject to certain conditions not being satisfied). Id. In addition,
although Healthy San Francisco became operative as of July 1, 2007, the employer spending
requirement did not go into effect until January 1, 2008. Id. § 14.8.
180. Id. §§14.1(b)(8), 14.3(a).
181. Id. §14.1(b)(7).
182. Id.
183. Id. § 14.3(b).
184. HEALTHY SAN FRANCISCO, supra note 147, at 5-6.
185. Id.; Conis & Medlin, supra note 152.
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Francisco forced them to bear an unfair share of financial responsibility for the
program and "would force them to lay off employees, raise prices, cut salaries, or
go out of business," all of which would be detrimental to the city of San
Francisco. 186 The 900-member Golden Gate Restaurant Association (GGRA), 187 in
particular, alleged that compliance with Healthy San Francisco would raise
restaurant operating costs by five percent, significantly reducing historically small
profit margins. 88 On November 8, 2006, shortly after the enactment of Healthy San
Francisco, the GGRA sued the city of San Francisco in an effort to overturn the
employer spending mandate on the grounds that it was preempted by ERISA.
189
B. Legal Challenge to Healthy San Francisco-Northern District of California
As if expecting an ERISA challenge, Section 14.6 of the San Francisco
Health Care Security Ordinance states "[n]othing in this Chapter shall be
interpreted or applied so as to create any power, duty or obligation in conflict with,
or preempted by, any Federal or State law."' 90 Nevertheless, on December 26,
2007, Judge White entered judgment in favor of the GGRA on the grounds that
Section 514(a) of ERISA preempted the San Francisco Health Care Security
Ordinance. 191 In reaching this result, Judge White analyzed the extent to which San
Francisco's ordinance "relate[d] to" an employee benefit plan by applying the two-
part test established in Shaw, whereby satisfaction of either prong results in
preemption under Section 514(a) of ERISA.192
Applying the first prong of the Shaw test, Judge White concluded that San
Francisco's law had a prohibited connection with employers' ERISA-regulated
plans. Specifically, Healthy San Francisco (1) affected ERISA plan administration,
(2) imposed ongoing administrative burdens upon employers, including record
186. Conis & Medlin, supra note 152.
187. Conis & Medlin, supra note 152. Similar to RILA, the GGRA is a non-profit trade association.
Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n, About GGRA, http://www.ggra.org/About.aspx (last visited May 16, 2010).
The GGRA's goals are "to promote, extend, and protect the interests of ... restaurant industry"
members in the San Francisco Bay Area. Id
188. Conis & Medlin, supra note 152.
189. Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Injunction, Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & County of
S.F., 535 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (No. C 06-6997 JSW), 2006 WL 3853281. The GGRA
sought a permanent injunction against the employer spending requirements imposed by Healthy San
Francisco. Id. at 3.
190. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE, SAN FRANCISCO HEALTH CARE SECURITY ORDINANCE § 14.6 (2006)
(emphasis added). The ordinance includes a severability provision:
If any section, subsection, clause, phrase, or portion of [the ordinance] is for any reason held
invalid or unconstitutional by any court or Federal or State agency ... , such portion shall be
deemed a separate, distinct and independent provision and such holding shall not affect the
validity of the remaining portions [of the ordinance].
Id. § 14.5.
191. Golden Gate Rest. Ass 'n, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 970.
192. Id. at 973, 975-77.
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keeping and reporting, that directly affected the scheme of providing health care
benefits, (3) both directly and indirectly affected the structure and administration of
ERISA plans, and (4) interfered with national uniform plan administration.
9 3
Similarly, Judge White found that San Francisco's law also failed the second prong
of the Shaw test by making an unlawful reference to employee benefit plans in two
ways. First, Judge White interpreted Healthy San Francisco as implicitly
referencing the existence of ERISA plans in its expenditure requirements
provisions.' 94 Second, he concluded that liability under Healthy San Francisco was
determined exclusively with reference to employer-sponsored health benefits that
are predominantly provided under existing ERISA plans. 95 In Judge White's
opinion, a covered employer could only determine its liability under Healthy San
Francisco by ascertaining how much it paid for employee health coverage under
existing plans.' 96 Therefore, "under either analysis, [Healthy San Francisco was]
preempted because it [had] both a connection with and references [to] ERISA
plans."' 97 Due to the fact that Healthy San Francisco "fail[ed] to withstand the
expansive test of ERISA preemption," the district court enjoined the
implementation and enforcement of the program. 1
98
C. Legal Challenge to Healthy San Francisco-Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Despite Judge White's ruling, the city of San Francisco immediately filed a
motion with the district court seeking a stay of the injunction pending an appeal to
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Although the district court denied the
motion, 199 on January 9, 2008, a unanimous three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
ordered a stay of the district court order pending an appeal by the city of San
Francisco. 2°° In reaching this decision, the Ninth Circuit panel noted the legal
standard for granting a stay constitutes a continuum, which requires an assessment
of the probability of success on the merits at one end and, at the other end, whether
"the balance of hardships tip[ped] sharply in favor of the party seeking the stay
.... ,201 Under this analytical framework, the court held that not only did a strong
likelihood of success on the merits exist but also that the balance of hardships
193. Id. at 975-77.
194. Id. at 978; see also § 14.1(b)(7) (calculating employer liability by looking at "amount[s] paid by
a covered employer to its covered employees or to a third party ... for the purpose of providing health
care services for covered employees").
195. Golden Gate Rest. Ass"n, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 979.
198. 1d. at 980.
199. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & County of S.F., No. C 06-06997 JSW, 2007 WL 4591729
(N.D. Cal. Dec 28, 2007).
200. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & County of S.F., 512 F.3d 1112, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008).
201. Id. at 1119 (internal quotes omitted).
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tipped sharply in favor of the city of San Francisco. °2 In addition, the panel found
that public interest supported granting the stay.20 3 On February 7, 2008, the GGRA
filed an application to the U.S. Supreme Court, seeking to lift the Ninth Circuit's
ruling.2° 4 However, on February 21, 2008, acting in his capacity as Circuit Justice
for the Ninth Circuit, Justice Kennedy denied the GGRA request.20 5 Thus, Healthy
San Francisco and its employer spending requirement remained in effect pending
the city of San Francisco's appeal of the district court decision. 0 6 On September
30, 2008, the Ninth Circuit's three-judge panel issued an opinion reversing the
district court's ruling and upholding Healthy San Francisco's employer spending
207requirement. In response to this ruling, on October 22, 2008, the GGRA
petitioned for a rehearing en banc before the Ninth Circuit.20 8 Nonetheless, on
March 9, 2009, the Ninth Circuit denied the request for rehearing en banc,
upholding the panel's decision that ERISA did not preempt the Healthy San
Francisco program. 20 9 The Ninth Circuit's denial of an en banc rehearing elicited
both dissenting and concurring opinions, which is relatively uncommon in terms of
federal appellate procedure.2 10
Joined by seven other judges, Judge Smith voiced his belief that "the San
Francisco Ordinance [was] clearly preempted by ERISA Section 514(a)" and
strongly dissented on several grounds.2 ' Specifically, Judge Smith asserted that the
Ninth Circuit's decision (1) created a circuit split with the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, (2) rendered the Shaw test meaningless and ignored ERISA preemption
guidelines established by Supreme Court precedent, and (3) "most importantly,
flout[ed] the mandate of national uniformity in the area of employer-provided
healthcare" that was at the core of ERISA's enactment.21 2 In relation to the issue of
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Labor Standards Enforcement, City & County of San Francisco, GGRA Litigation,
http://sfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=424 (last visited May 16, 2010).
205. Id. Justice Kennedy did not issue an opinion explaining the reasons for denying the request.
Justice Kennedy Denies Request for Order to Block San Francisco Fair Share Health Law, Pens. &
Ben. Daily (BNA) No. 36 (Feb. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Justice Kennedy Denies Request].
206. Justice Kennedy Denies Request, supra note 205.
207. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & County of S.F., 546 F.3d 639, 661 (2008). This ruling was
made by the same panel that issued the stay of the district court's decision. Id.
208. Petition for Rehearing En Bane, Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & County of S.F., 546 F.3d
639 (9th Cir. 2008) (Nos. 07-17370, 07-17372), 2008 WL 4918566.
209. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & County of S.F., 558 F.3d 1000, 1001 (9th Cir. 2009).
210. Id. at 1001 (Fletcher, J., concurring); id. at 1004 (Smith, Kozinksi, O'Scannlain, Kleinfeld,
Tallman, Bybee, Callahan, & Bea, JJ., dissenting). More typically, such a denial is purely procedural,
resulting in neither concurring nor dissenting opinions. See Michael E. Solimine, Due Process and En
Banc Decisionmaking, 48 ARiz. L. REv. 325, 332-33 & tbl.l (2006) (stating that the number of
published opinions accompanying orders of denying en banc requests did not seem particularly large
within each circuit).
211. Id. at 1004, 1009-10 (Smith, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 1004.
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national uniformity, the dissenting opinion raised a more overarching policy
concern with respect to the Ninth Circuit's decision, suggesting that the decision to
allow San Francisco to implement Healthy San Francisco created "a roadmap" for
other state and local governments to circumvent ERISA preemption. 21 3 "[S]imilar
laws [would] become commonplace," undermining the congressional goal of
minimizing the administrative and financial burdens imposed on employee benefit
plan administrators and resulting in "adverse consequences to employers and
employees alike. 214
With respect to the creation of a circuit split between the Ninth Circuit and
Fourth Circuit, the dissent argued that the employer spending requirements
imposed by Healthy San Francisco and Maryland's Fair Share Act were
functionally indistinguishable.215 The issue was not whether employers had a
"meaningful alternative" through which to make non-ERISA payments; rather,
"[c]overed employers under San Francisco's Ordinance must coordinate their non-
ERISA payments with their ERISA plans in the very manner the Fielder court
deemed impermissible., 2 16 Essentially, a non-complying covered employer in San
Francisco faced the same choice as a non-complying covered employer in
Maryland; the employer could either "[m]ake a payment to the government or
change its current ERISA plan."2 17 Regardless of which payment the employer
decides to make, the practical effect is to impose a penalty upon the employer
rather than to provide a meaningful alternative for compliance.2t8 Therefore, by
allowing Healthy San Francisco to impose its employer spending requirement, the
dissent contended that the Ninth Circuit "create[d] a circuit split on the issue of
,,219
whether ERISA preempts 'fair share' or 'play-or-pay' ordinances.
In addition, the dissent alleged that the Ninth Circuit chose to disregard
Supreme Court precedent establishing ERISA preemption principles, conflicting
with decisions in both Egelhoff v. Egelhoff220 and District of Columbia v. Greater
Washington Bd. of Trade.22' Emphasizing the fact ERISA was enacted to eliminate
the burden of conflicting obligations on employers operating in multiple
jurisdictions,22 the dissent cited Egelhoff for the proposition that states and
localities cannot avoid preemption by offering employers a theoretical means by
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1006-07.
216. Id. at 1006.
217. Id. at 1006-07.
218. Id. at 1007.
219. Id.
220. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
221. 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
222. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n, 558 F.3d at 1007 (citing Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 151).
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which to avoid changing existing ERISA plans.223 Under the dissent's
interpretation of Egelhoff, an employer's ability to "opt out" of the state law did not
prevent it from having an impermissible "connection with" ERISA plans. 224 In this
manner, the dissent analogized Egelhoff to San Francisco's ordinance, asserting
that covered employers who have not achieved the minimum spending requirement
face one of the two following choices: they can either (1) increase or maintain
health care expenditures under existing plans or (2) pay San Francisco an amount
equal to the mandated minimum.225 However, under the dissent's interpretation of
Section 514(a) and Supreme Court precedent, either choice bears a prohibited
"connection with" employer's employee benefit plans, preempting Healthy San
Francisco under ERISA.226 In addition, notwithstanding the choices available to
employers in complying with San Francisco's requirement, allowing such a law
would require plan administrators to potentially contend with such provisions in
every state; the necessary burden of monitoring, accounting for, and complying
with a multitude of state and local laws was "exactly the burden ERISA [sought] to
eliminate.' 227
Similarly, the dissent analogized the employer spending mandate under
Healthy San Francisco to the Washington, D.C. law challenged in Greater
Washington.228 Washington, D.C.'s "ordinance required employers to provide the
same medical coverage to injured employees as to non-injured, active
employees. 229 Under that law, employers could provide benefits to injured
employees through a separate non-ERISA plan; nonetheless, the court found the
law was preempted by ERISA on the grounds that it "impermissibly referred to an
ERISA plan. '230 This prohibited reference arose because the benefits for each class
of employees had to be equal, which necessarily required a comparison to the
existing ERISA plan.23' Similarly, while covered employers might not have to
amend their ERISA plans in order to comply with San Francisco's ordinance,
whether covered employers are in compliance with the spending requirement can
only be determined by using such employers' current ERISA plans as a
reference.232 Consequently, the dissent flatly rejected the notion that the issue could
be framed in terms of obligations measured by reference to payments provided by
the employer to an ERISA plan or another entity under Healthy San Francisco




227. Id. (quoting Egelhoff 532 U.S. at 151).
228. Id. at 1008.
229. Id.
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versus obligations measured by reference to the level of benefits provided by the
ERISA plan to an employee in Greater Washington.
233
"[M]ost importantly, [Judge Smith] dissent[ed] because this case concerns an
issue of exceptional national importance, i.e., national uniformity in the area of
employer-provided healthcare. ' 234 The dissent insisted that the Ninth Circuit
decision "ignore[d] ERISA's preemption goals," focusing instead "on ERISA's
objective of protecting against misuse of [employee] benefit plan funds," despite
the fact that preemption, and not misuse, "was central to ERISA's
implementation." 235 Without uniformity, multi-state employers face significant
hardships; such employers cannot offer all similarly situated employees the same
236benefits nor can they achieve continuity in their respective benefit programs. As
an example, the dissent noted that employees of a national restaurant chain
operating in Oakland and San Francisco would receive different benefits, and the
employer would be subject to different requirements, notwithstanding their
237geographic proximity. While complying with San Francisco's law may not be
particularly onerous on a small scale, "if we consider the possibility of numerous
cities, counties and states enacting similar laws, the burden this places on
employers is potentially very great, thereby encouraging affected employers to drop
their ERISA plans as a cost saving measure.,,23 8 By allowing San Francisco's health
access program, the Ninth Circuit provided a roadmap for other states and localities
to institute employer spending requirements, leading to "health care expenditure
239balkanization," which is exactly what ERISA was meant to prevent.
Having written the original Ninth Circuit panel decision, Judge Fletcher
concurred in the court's decision not to rehear the matter en banc and drafted a
concurring opinion to respond to the dissent's arguments. In particular, Judge
Fletcher systematically rejected the dissent's contentions that the Ninth Circuit's
decision (1) "create[d] a circuit conflict" with Fielder,240 (2) conflicted with
Supreme Court precedent, 24' and (3) that ERISA "require[d] national uniformity in
the provision of health care. 242 Addressing the potential split with the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Fielder, Judge Fletcher suggested that the two cases can be
distinguished on the issue of "meaningful choice., 243 Maryland's Fair Share Act
233. Id.
234. Id. (emphasis added).





240. Id. at 1001-02 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
241. Id. at 1003.
242. Id. at 1004.
243. Id. at 1002.
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"require[d] employers with 10,000 or more Maryland employees to spend at least
[eight percent] of their total payrolls on employees' health insurance costs or pay
the amount their spending falls short to the State of Maryland.",244 Any employer
subject to the minimum spending threshold did not receive anything in return for
itself or its employees as a result of payments made to the state; due to the
employer size threshold, the only employer covered by the law was Wal-Mart.
Since the practical effect of Maryland's law was to require Wal-Mart to increase its
ERISA coverage of employees, 245 the law was impermissibly related to ERISA.
2 46
In contrast, under San Francisco's health access program, covered employees
"are entitled to obtain health care benefits.., at reduced rates. 247 According to
Judge Fletcher, rather than "imposing a de facto obligation," this structure
presented a "meaningful choice" to covered employers between either (1) meeting
the minimum spending threshold imposed by Healthy San Francisco or (2) paying
the tax to San Francisco in exchange for its employees receiving access to health
care services provided by the city.248 In addition, Judge Fletcher argued that San
Francisco's fair share law does not require covered employers to coordinate non-
ERISA payments imposed by the minimum spending requirement with their
existing ERISA plans.249 Under the Maryland law, "Wal-Mart's use of the non-
ERISA spending option would necessarily produce a change in its ERISA
plans. 25° In Judge Fletcher's opinion, no change in any ERISA plan resulted from
a covered employer paying the tax imposed by Healthy San Francisco; however,
Judge Fletcher makes this broad statement without any additional discussion or
251comparison.
In addition, Judge Fletcher asserted that the Ninth Circuit's decision did not
conflict with the Supreme Court's decisions in either Egelhoff or Greater
Washington.252 In Egelhoff, the court examined a state law that required plan
administrators to adhere to state law in designating plan beneficiaries. Respondents
argued that the law was not preempted by ERISA because it provided an option to
244. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007).
245. Id. at 183, 193. According to Fielder, healthcare benefits represent a portion of an employee's
total compensation. Id. at 193. By increasing healthcare benefits and therefore total compensation, an
employer receives consideration for this payment in the form of improved retention and performance of
current employees and the ability to attract and recruit potential future employees; in contrast, the
employer receives no consideration by making a payment to the state for which it receives nothing in
return. Id. Effectively, "the only rational choice employers have under the [Maryland law] is to structure
their ERISA healthcare benefit plans so as to meet the minimum spending threshold." Id.
246. Id. at 197.
247. Golden Gate Rest. Ass 'n, 558 F.3d at 1002 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1002-03.
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plan administrators; however, the court rejected this argument and held that the law
bound "plan administrators to a particular choice of rules for determining
beneficiary status., 25 3 By forcing administrators to either follow the state's
beneficiary designation scheme or alter the terms of their ERISA plans, the
challenged statute forced plan administrators to make a change to their ERISA
plans one way or another and was therefore preempted by Section 514(a).254
Relying upon his analysis in relation to Fielder, Judge Fletcher maintained that San
Francisco's ordinance did not require any change to an ERISA plan and was
therefore distinguishable from the result in Egelhoff2"
While Egelhoff dealt with the issue of a state law imposing changes upon
ERISA plans, Greater Washington analyzed the determination of the requisite level
of benefits under an employer mandate.256 In Greater Washington, Washington,
D.C. implemented a law that determined the requisite level of benefits by
"reference to" existing health insurance coverage provided by employers;
according to the court, this calculation constituted an impermissible reference to an
ERISA plan.257 In contrast, Judge Fletcher argued that Healthy San Francisco's
required payments are determined by reference to hours worked by an employee
rather than by reference to benefits provided by an ERISA plan. A covered
employer's required payments can be reduced or eliminated by making payments
to, among other things, an employee's ERISA plan;259 however, "the amount of the
reduction is determined by reference to the amount of money paid" on behalf of the
employee in reference to the number of hours worked.2 60 For this reason, Judge
Fletcher argued that Healthy San Francisco is distinguishable from Greater
Washington.261 Notwithstanding the closely related issues raised in Egelhoff and
Greater Washington, Judge Fletcher maintained that the Ninth Circuit's decision
was not inconsistent with existing Supreme Court precedent due to the particular
facts and circumstances related to Healthy San Francisco's structure and
implementation.262
Finally, Judge Fletcher rejected the dissent's position that "ERISA responds
to the 'need for nationally uniform plan administration' and a 'uniform regulatory
253. Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141,147, 150 (2001).
254. Id. at 150.
255. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n, 558 F.3d at 1003.
256. Id.
257. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130-31 (1992).
258. Golden Gate Rest. Ass 'n, 558 F.3d at 1003; see also S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE, SAN FRANCIscO
HEALTH CARE SECURITY OrINANCE § 14.1 (b)(8) (2006) (defining the health care expenditure rate).
259. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n, 558 F.3d at 1003; §§ 14.1(b)(7), 14.3.
260. Golden Gate Rest. Ass 'n, 558 F.3d at 1003 (emphasis added).
261. Id.
262. See supra notes 252-61 and accompanying text.
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system.' 263 Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.
Coyne,264 Judge Fletcher argued that the purpose of ERISA was not to require
national uniformity in the provision of health care but rather to ensure
administrative practices of a benefit plan are governed only by a single set of
regulations.265 Assuming that nothing in San Francisco's plan required employers
to establish an ERISA plan or to alter an existing ERISA plan, Judge Fletcher
concluded that "nothing in the Ordinance interfere[d] in any way with the
11266uniformity of ERISA regulations.
At least one thing is clear from the Ninth Circuit's final decision-its
members have distinctly different viewpoints on the permissibility of Healthy San
Francisco and whether ERISA preemption affords any opportunity for health care
reform through state or local fair share laws. Whether the Supreme Court will
ultimately weigh in on this matter remains to be seen. On March 18, 2009, the
GGRA filed an application to the Supreme Court for an emergency injunction,
seeking to prevent San Francisco from continuing to impose the employer spending
requirement while the GGRA appeals the Ninth Circuit decision to the Supreme
Court.26 7 However, on March 30, 2009, Justice Kennedy once again denied the
GGRA's request for an emergency stay.268 On June 5, 2009, the GGRA filed a
petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, but so far, the Court has not
decided whether to hear the case.269 Instead, the Supreme Court has invited U.S.
Solicitor General Elena Kagan to file a brief expressing the federal government's
views with respect to the GGRA's petition, but the Solicitor General has yet to file
a brief in this matter.270 Thus, the health care benefits provided under the Healthy
San Francisco program, as well as the employer spending requirements that fund a
portion of the program, remain in effect for the time being.
CONCLUSION
"Although ERISA's legislative history makes clear that Congress intended to
craft a broad preemption provision, it is far from clear that Congress anticipated the
263. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n, 558 F.3d at 1004 (Fletcher, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 1008-09
(Smith, J., dissenting)).
264. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
265. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n, 558 F.3d at 1004 (Fletcher, J., concurring) (citing Fort Halifax
Packing Co., 482 U.S. at 11).
266. Id.
267. Labor Standards Enforcement, supra note 204.
268. Id. Justice Kennedy did not issue an opinion explaining the reasons for denying GGRA's
second request for an emergency injunction. Bob Egelko, High Court Denies Restaurants' Stay Request,
S. F. CHRON., Mar. 31, 2009, at B2.
269. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & County of S.F., 558 F.3d
1000 (9th Cir. 2009) (N. 08-1515), 2009 WL 1630302.
270. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & County of S.F., 130 S. Ct. 357 (2009) (mem.).
2010]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
extent of the law's impact on health care regulation., 27' Effectively, in enacting
ERISA, members of Congress failed to consider the breadth of Section 514(a) and
"the effect such a broad preemption clause would have on the ability of states to
regulate in fields even remotely related to employee benefit plans. 272 Even with
the recent enactment of sweeping federal health care legislation, the U.S. Supreme
Court should take action on the issue of ERISA preemption as it relates to fair share
laws and other state and local health care reforms. Many of the benefits of the
national health care bill, including expanding health insurance coverage for the
uninsured, will not be realized for several years. Even once national health care
reform has been fully implemented, the issue of providing access to health care for
the uninsured will persist, albeit at reduced numbers. While the recent federal
health care bill makes it clear that states will be required to provide some minimum
level of health care benefits, the extent to which they can provide additional
benefits funded by an employer spending mandate remains unclear in light of
existing ERISA preemption doctrine.
As evidenced by litigation in Maryland, Suffolk County, NY, and the city of
San Francisco, Section 514(a) of ERISA significantly constrains state or local
efforts to finance expanded health care coverage with an employer financing
component. Certainly, state and local governments could expand access to health
care without employer assistance, but this would eliminate a critical source of
financing for such initiatives. As state and local budget deficits increase under the
strain of the economic downturn, it is unlikely that they will be willing to expand
coverage without some portion being financed by employers. Effectively, ERISA
greatly limits the manner and means by which state and local governments can
increase access to health care. Thus, the enactment of federal health care legislation
does not reduce the necessity and urgency for the Supreme Court to intervene in
Golden Gate Restaurant Ass'n and assess the validity of the San Francisco Health
Care Security Ordinance.
The Supreme Court could deny certiorari in this matter and thereby implicitly
uphold the Ninth Circuit decision. While such a result would certainly be a victory
for Healthy San Francisco, it would fail to take advantage of an opportunity to add
clarity to ERISA preemption doctrine. Failure to take action on the part of the
Supreme Court would allow a legal gray area to persist with respect to the viability
of employer spending mandates. Rather, the better approach would be for the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari in this matter, taking an important step in
defining Section 514(a) as it relates to employee benefit plans and health care
271. Sharon Jacobs, On the Mend: The Ninth Circuit Gives San Francisco's Health Care Security
Ordinance the Green Light (for Now), 36 J. L. MED. & ETHics 431, 433 (2008) (citing Stephen F. Befort
& Christopher J. Kopka, The Sounds of Silence: The Libertarian Ethos of ERISA Preemption, 52 FLA. L.
REV. 1, 26-29 (2000)).
272. Emily V. Griffen, Comment, "Relations Stop Nowhere": ERISA Preemption of San Francisco's
Domestic Partner Ordinance, 89 CAL. L. REV. 459, 487 (2001).
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reform. Issuing a ruling in this matter would clarify the manner and means by
which state and local governments can implement and finance health care reform
aimed at expanding access to health. Even with the enactment of national health
care reform, a decision by the Supreme Court in Golden Gate Restaurant Ass 'n,
would provide state and local governments with a roadmap as to how they can
expand upon or supplement the federal health care legislation and finance such
efforts without running afoul of ERISA.273
Absent judicial intervention clarifying the scope of ERISA preemption,
Congress should consider amending ERISA to provide relief from Section 514(a)
and allow continued experimentation at the state and local level.. One option would
be for Congress to eliminate Section 514(a) entirely and allow principles of implied
preemption to guide judicial interpretation with respect to the proper balance
between state and federal law.274 However, such action would be far too drastic.
Not only would repealing Section 514(a) undoubtedly promote more, rather than
less, litigation and uncertainty with respect to state and local initiatives aimed at
expanding health care, but it would also throw the field of employee benefits law
into utter turmoil.
Alternatively, Congress could choose to amend Section 514(a), Advocates for
amending ERISA contend that ERISA's preemption provision unduly constrains
comprehensive health insurance reform at state and local levels by preventing state
and local governments from regulating employment-based group health plans.
275
One way that Congress could amend Section 514(a) would be to establish
minimum standards for health care plans and making employer-sponsored plans
mandatory, including a requisite level of employer financing. Presumably, this
approach would elicit substantial opposition from employers and industry leaders.
Given the passionate response elicited by the debate over national health care
reform, such an amendment hardly seems palatable, let alone possible. Conversely,
Congress could amend ERISA to expressly allow limited and targeted
experimentation at the state and local level. For example, Congress could enact
express ERISA waivers for a handful of localities and states, such as San Francisco
and Massachusetts, which have already begun experimentation with health care
reform or have new programs in the pipeline.276 This would enable state and local
governments to take the reins in designing programs that expand coverage in the
most efficient and practicable way possible. At the same time, such an approach
273. In the event that the Supreme Court were to uphold San Francisco's Health Care Security
Ordinance, such a ruling would firmly establish employer mandates as another source of financing
available to fund state and local initiatives to expand access to health care for the uninsured.
274. Griffen, supra note 272, at 503 (stating that since the legislative history of ERISA clearly
expresses an intent to preempt the field of pension plan administration, removing "[Sjection 514(a)
would not allow state laws that conflict with ERISA's purposes to survive").
275. Pierron & Fronstin, supra note 30, at 13.
276. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
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would allow for incremental, long-term health care reform and might be the best
solution to overcoming the impasse between ERISA preemption and
experimentation with health care reform at the state and local level.
Eliminating or mitigating the constraining effect of ERISA would not only
allow state and local governments to supplement the federal health care legislation
with their own health care reform initiatives, but it would also allow such
governments to enact regulations that take local preferences and circumstances into
consideration. For example, statistics show that between 2006 and 2007, employer-
sponsored health insurance covered approximately sixty percent of nonelderly
residents nationwide while almost eighteen percent of such residents were
uninsured.277 Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wisconsin all reported over
sixty-eight percent of nonelderly residents insured under employer-sponsored
programs while less than ten percent of such residents were uninsured.278 Thus,
these four states significantly outperformed the national average at both ends of the
spectrum.279 In contrast, Arizona, California, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas all significantly underperformed the national
averages. Each of these states reported less than fifty-six percent of nonelderly
residents insured under employer-sponsored programs while more than twenty
percent of such residents were uninsured.280 These figures highlight the significant
variation in the distribution of nonelderly residents covered under employer-
sponsored insurance versus those without any coverage at the state level. 28'
Differences in the distribution of state coverage suggest that allowing local
government experimentation could be beneficial to the extent that states are able to
adequately identify local preferences and adapt programs aimed at supplementing
the health care mandates present under the federal legislation.
While the recent enactment of national health care legislation practically
eliminates the likelihood that state or local governments will undertake significant
health care reform in the short term, it does not eliminate the importance of
clarifying the scope of ERISA preemption with regard to employer spending
mandates. At least with respect to Healthy San Francisco specifically and health
care reform generally, the optimal solution would be for the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari and issue a definitive ruling in the matter. Regardless of whether the
Supreme Court upholds or rejects the Ninth Circuit opinion, it would help to settle
the question of whether state and local governments can rely upon employer




281. Only the percent of nonelderly residents covered by employer-sponsored insurance and the
percent of such residents with no insurance coverage are identified here. Id. The percentage of
nonelderly residents covered under other forms of private and public insurance, including Medicaid and
private individual insurance, also varies significantly by state. Id.
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spending mandates as a financing component for expanding access to health care.
In the event that the Supreme Court continues to take a pass on the issue, then the
next best solution is for Congress to amend ERISA-although this seems even
more unlikely. In either case, despite the enactment of sweeping federal health care
legislation, state and local governments will continue to play an important role in
bridging the gap between the uninsured and access to health care. How well they
are able to perform that role, however, particularly in providing expanded or
custom-tailored health care benefits that go beyond the scope of the national
legislation, will depend upon the extent to which ERISA continues to impede state
and local health care reform.

